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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of a massive financial meltdown that has triggered a 
protracted crisis and recession, one might argue that the time has come for 
commentators to reduce their emphasis on intentional wrongdoing within 
corporations, insofar as this last go-around of failures seemed to be caused 
by factors beyond simple, intentional fraud.1  Nevertheless, our appetite for 
 
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School.  This book review stems from comments that 
were delivered at an Author Meets Reader panel at the Law and Society Association’s 
Annual Meeting in San Francisco, 2011, which was organized by Tanina Rostain.  The 
author thanks Tom Baker and Sean Griffith for encouraging the writing of this review and 
their generous feedback in response to an earlier draft.  The author also gratefully thanks 
Professor Rostain for her invitation to sit on the Law and Society panel, as well as Dana 
Brakman-Reiser, James Fanto, Roberta Karmel, and James Park for comments on earlier 
drafts, and Dean Michael Gerber and President Joan Wexler of Brooklyn Law School, 
whose summer research stipend supported the writing of this Review.   
 1.  Commentators have attributed the meltdown to numerous factors, although there 
appears to be a consensus that “excessive risk-taking by major financial institutions was an 
important cause [of the crisis] . . . and consequently, that there were significant failures of 
risk management systems at such firms.”  Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-
Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 50 (2010); RICHARD 
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM (2009) (blaming the financial crisis on poor regulatory 
response to risk-taking); Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time 
of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011) (identifying moral hazard and excessive risk-taking 
within financial firms as cause of crisis); see also Brian Cheffins, Did Corporate 
Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 
BUS. LAW. 1, 3–4 (2009) (concluding from an empirical study that corporate governance 
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the subject—and the various mechanisms that seem best poised to fight 
it—remains as strong as ever.  Perhaps this is because economic crises—
intentional or otherwise—deftly highlight the extent to which corporate 
chieftains exercise a vast amount of power and influence over our economy 
and political system.2  It is hardly surprising, then, that commentators 
worry both about the ways in which corporate chieftains abuse the 
shareholding public’s trust, and whether existing legal tools are best 
designed to deter such abuses. 
Professors Tom Baker and Sean Griffith have enhanced this highly 
charged debate with their nuanced and fine-grained account of how 
corporations procure insurance for their directors and officers (so-called 
“D&O insurance”).3  Baker and Griffith skillfully educate their audience on 
what this type of insurance is, how it is sold and marketed, and how it 
affects corporate officers and directors and the possibility of misconduct 
within corporate firms.  Although the discussion is balanced and thorough, 
the title itself will lead most readers to conclude the worst, which is that 
D&O insurance “ensures” the continued existence of corporate misconduct 
by shielding directors and officers from personal monetary liability and 
legal accountability.4  Although the authors do not contend that D&O 
 
functioned fairly well outside of the financial sector). 
 2.  “Corporations dominate the business world, accounting for an overwhelming 
majority of commercial revenues and serving as the nearly exclusive organizational form for 
large-scale enterprise.”  Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1507, 1507 (2009).   
 3.  TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010).  Earlier discussions 
of these issues appeared in other works by Baker and Griffith.  See Tom Baker & Sean J. 
Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ and Officers’ 
Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting 
Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits 
Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
755 (2009).  
 4.  The concern that directors and officers have escaped the consequences of their own 
malfeasance has been well explored in both the business press and academic literature.  See, 
e.g., Steven Davidoff, Ex-Directors of Failed Firms Have Little to Fear, DealBook (Aug. 2, 
2011, 8:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/ex-directors-of-failed-firms-have-
little-to-fear/; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay 
on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006); Renee M. 
Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in 
Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving 
Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, 
Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007) [hereinafter Wheels]; see also Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & 
Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (finding close 
to no risk for outside directors for inattentiveness or insufficient oversight). 
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insurance causes fraud, they nevertheless argue that its presence vastly 
undermines the private litigation system erected to deter fraud.  
Accordingly, Baker and Griffith focus private litigation’s critics on a new 
target, the D&O insurance product that so well serves corporate directors 
and officers. 
Through excerpts of multiple conversations with key players in the 
insurance world,5 Baker and Griffith paint a picture that is not particularly 
pretty:  insurance prevents managers from paying for the costs of securities 
litigation stemming from corporate misconduct, but the insurance 
insufficiently reflects the corporation’s individual governance risks.6  
During the life of the insurance policy, insurance carriers fail to monitor the 
insureds adequately (if at all).7  Finally, when litigation arises, D&O 
insurers (unlike other types of carriers) allow corporate managers 
substantial latitude to negotiate settlements with insurers’ money.8  In sum, 
insurance carriers fail to monitor corporate managers robustly before, 
during, and after an incident of corporate misconduct surfaces. 
One might reply that, whatever its drawbacks, D&O insurance at least 
spreads a single corporation’s litigation risk to a broader pool, which in 
turn indirectly benefits shareholders.  But even here, Baker and Griffith see 
little value.  Insurance carriers charge fees in exchange for performing their 
risk-spreading function; corporations, and effectively their shareholders, 
pay these fees.  Shareholders, however, could just as easily avoid the fees 
by skipping the insurance and diversifying their stock portfolios.9 
Nor do Baker and Griffith find much of an information-pooling 
benefit from D&O insurance, through which firms might discover the 
techniques or structures that result in less serious or frequent wrongdoing.10  
Unlike other types of insurance (casualty insurance, for example), D&O 
 
 5.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 13–17 (describing research methodology and 
listing categories of interview subjects). 
 6.  Id. at 103–04 (concluding that although carriers “attempt to price corporate 
governance risk” their efforts may be compromised by market forces and “defects of either 
the underwriting system or the liability system”).   
 7.  Id. at 109 (“D&O insurers do almost nothing to monitor the public corporations 
they insure.”). 
 8.  “D&O insurance policies provide the insurance company with the right to 
‘associate’ in the defense of the claim, meaning that the insurer is entitled to receive 
information about the defense of the claim and to provide input to the defense lawyers, but 
the clear understanding and practice are that the policy holder, not the insurance company, 
controls the defense of the claim.”  Id. at 130 (identifying key differences between D&O 
insurance defense and other forms of liability insurance). 
 9.  Id. at 57–58. 
 10.  See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
593, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038105 (discussing insurance pooling). 
BAER_FINAL_1932726.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2012  10:03 AM 
930 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
insurance does not produce industry-wide data leading to better compliance 
outcomes.11  Since D&O insurance does not produce better outcomes, it 
simply protects managers from payouts and introduces moral hazard.12  
Corporate officers become less, not more, accountable for corporate 
wrongdoing, and shareholders foot the bill.13 
This is a deeply troubling critique, likely to invoke concern and 
discomfort among jurists, policymakers and academics.  Some may 
conclude from Baker and Griffith’s findings that we should discontinue or 
radically curtail the availability of D&O insurance, even though the authors 
themselves avoid embracing such a drastic response.  Others may see 
Baker and Griffith’s account as additional support for the view that public 
enforcement by the SEC, as opposed to private enforcement via 
shareholder litigation, is the optimal vehicle for restraining corporate 
misconduct.14   
Like Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, this Book Review also adopts a 
pragmatic approach, albeit one that is more skeptical of the notion that 
corporate managers can commit fraud without worry.  As I argue below, 
the state of the world becomes a bit murkier when one reflects upon the 
porous boundary between ordinary and extraordinary corporate 
misconduct.  It is along this boundary that the limited, spontaneous 
embezzlement scheme imperceptibly bleeds into a multi-year, multi-
division Ponzi scheme.  Whereas the former may be solely the focus of 
private litigation, the latter is very much the focus of public enforcement 
and sanctions.  Although the authors acknowledge that corporate 
misconduct can support “a multiplicity of state and federal causes of 
action,”15 their critique downplays the effect of public enforcement 
 
 11.  Instead, D&O insurance “mutes the deterrence effect of shareholder litigation.”  
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 201.  
 12.  “As it is currently structured, D&O insurance significantly erodes the deterrent 
effect of shareholder litigation, thereby undermining its effectiveness as a form of 
regulation.”  Id. at 3.  For a useful recent discussion of moral hazard and insurance, see 
Dustin E. Buehler & Steve P. Calandrillo, Baseball’s Moral Hazard: Law, Economics, and 
the Designated Hitter Rule, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2097–99 (2010). 
 13.  “[V]irtually all U.S. public corporations purchase D&O insurance, and shareholder 
litigation is largely funded by insurance proceeds.  What this ultimately means, to both 
plaintiffs and corporate defendants alike, is that their settlements are funded by other 
people’s money.”  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 202. 
 14.  For examples of recent calls for a reduced emphasis on or narrowing of private 
shareholder litigation for securities fraud, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011) (arguing for 
substantial narrowing of private fraud-on-the-market claims); and Amanda M. Rose, 
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and 
Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (suggesting 
prescreening role for SEC). 
 15.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 40. 
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responses on corporate managers, in part because they appear to believe 
that much of private litigation is directed at “ordinary” fraud, and that 
public enforcers reserve their limited resources for extraordinary “super-
frauds.”16  If the line between ordinary and extraordinary fraud is weak, 
however, then a robust public deterrence effort for the latter may make up 
for a weak private deterrence system for the former.  No doubt, the 
permeability of this boundary does not undermine Baker and Griffith’s key 
claim that shareholders have been paying for a product that produces 
relatively few returns.  Still, it provides important insights on the authors’ 
policy suggestions for improving the current state of affairs.  These 
proposals (for a “coinsurance” system, disclosure of insurance contracts, 
and a lottery system designed to reduce settlements),17 may be less 
necessary, and in some instances, redundant, when we consider the broader 
enforcement landscape in which corporate managers reside.18 
The remainder of this Review proceeds in three parts.  First, I 
summarize the authors’ analysis of the D&O insurance market and its 
alleged effect on corporate management.  In Part II, I analyze Baker and 
Griffith’s accountability critique by exploring at length the porous 
boundary between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” frauds.19  Since no level 
of insurance protects corporate chieftains from the wrath of criminal 
prosecutors, state attorneys general, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) Enforcement Division, D&O insurance’s potential 
for causing moral hazard in private litigation therefore must be considered 
alongside the deterrence effects of public enforcement.20  With this broader 
 
 16.  Id. at 60–61 (suggesting that nonmonetary losses such as criminal penalties and 
loss of reputation “do not follow from most acts that give rise to a D&O claim”).   
 17.  See discussion infra pp. 124-27 (laying out proposals in greater detail).  
 18.  This is not to deny that private and public corporate enforcement mechanisms have 
collectively demonstrated serious shortcomings.  See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, 
and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1297–1313 (2011) 
(providing a recent overview of the literature documenting flaws in entity-liability as a 
deterrent of corporate accounting fraud).  
 19.  I focus on fraud because it is the primary target of Baker and Griffith’s critique.  
See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 21 (“Much of our discussion therefore focuses on 
shareholder class actions under the federal securities laws, particularly 10b-5 class 
actions.”).   
 20.  Several scholars have recognized and addressed the fact that multiple private and 
public enforcers address corporate wrongdoing.  See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall Thomas 
with the assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 
DUKE L.J. 737, 738 (2003) (observing that “[a] public private partnership for the 
enforcement of the securities laws is now entering its eighth decade”).  Cf. Geraldine Szott 
Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and 
Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1470 (2009) (noting that “private civil 
actions involving securities laws may be viewed as ‘essential supplements’ to public 
enforcement or as abusive demands on law-abiding companies”).   
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enforcement picture in mind, I assess in Part III several of Baker and 
Griffith’s policy proposals. 
I. THE DEPRESSING STORY OF D&O LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Baker and Griffith begin their analysis with a brief exploration of the 
justifications for corporate shareholder litigation.21  The authors agree with 
the scholarly consensus that the compensation rationale for shareholder 
litigation is neither accurate nor desirable.22  Shareholders receive a mere 
fraction of their losses once attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation are taken 
into account.23  Moreover, it is far from clear that shareholders are entitled 
to any payout, given securities litigation’s circularity.24  That is, when the 
company agrees to a settlement for securities fraud (or in rare cases, pays a 
post-trial judgment), its current shareholders effectively pay those 
shareholders who purchased and sold securities during the fraud period for 
the misconduct that was committed by directors and officers.  Assuming 
shareholders are diversified, they are simply paying themselves, less 
transaction costs, for the very wrongs they suffered.25 
With compensation out of the way, deterrence remains the only real 
justification for shareholder litigation.  The authors rightfully question 
whether the system for procuring D&O liability protection enhances, 
 
 21.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 5–10.  
 22.  See id. at 6 (observing that “an emerging consensus among most corporate and 
securities law scholars rejects compensation as a justification for shareholder litigation”).  
 23.  See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1545–47 (striking down the compensation rationale); 
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 635 & n.35 (“[Private litigation] delivers at best only five to ten 
cents per dollar of alleged losses (often less), compensates far too many investors who do 
not have the same claim to compensation, and comes at a very high price tag that eats up 
fifteen to thirty percent of the claims in plaintiffs’ legal fees and costs plus arguably even 
more in indirect costs (particularly defendants’ legal fees and costs).”).  
 24.  Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
237, 252 (2009) (contending that “the primary social benefit from a higher level of 
disclosure by established issuers is not the protection of investors from unfair prices or 
risk”).   
 25.  This is the famous pocket-shifting or “circularity” argument that has long been a 
source of discussion among corporate academics.  See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. 
Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (1992) (describing how private securities litigation simultaneously 
imposes costs and benefits on innocent shareholders); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1562–63 
(2006) (noting that private securities litigation, victims of fraudulent behavior and 
shareholders are largely the same class); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem 
in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 345–47 (explaining why the 
circularity problem exists only when diversified investors are assumed).  But see James J. 
Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 328–33 (2009) 
(questioning existence of circularity problem by comparing settlement payment to the 
corporate dividend). 
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undermines, or has no effect on litigation’s deterrent effect.  Based on their 
interviews with, among others, risk managers and D&O brokers and 
carriers, Baker and Griffith soberly conclude that insurance undermines the 
deterrent effect of shareholder litigation. 
The key to understanding this critique is Baker and Griffith’s succinct 
description of the standard D&O insurance product.  Each insurance policy 
has three components, which are called “sides” by the industry 
participants.26  Side A coverage directly covers directors and officers for 
claims for which the company cannot practically or legally pay.27  The 
second and third “sides” of the standard D&O policy, Sides B and C, are 
the stronger targets of Baker and Griffith’s critique, as these provisions 
compensate the company for the indemnification it pays directors and 
officers (Side B), and for any liability the company bears separately on its 
own (Side C).28  As the authors explain, Side C seems to have arisen to 
keep the insurance carriers from arguing with insureds over how a 
particular settlement ought to be allocated when “the company” and its 
officers and directors are deemed equally responsible for a given course of 
conduct.29 
Although the authors are willing to accept the standard argument for 
A-side protection, which is that it serves as a form of protection for 
otherwise risk-averse officers and directors,30 Baker and Griffith are far 
more critical of Sides B and C, which also happen to be the sources of the 
“vast majority”31 of D&O insurance payments. 
 
 26.  See generally BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 46–48 (discussing Sides A, B, 
and C). 
 27.  The company’s inability to indemnify the corporate manager may result from its 
bankruptcy or stem from the fact that Delaware law permits corporations to insure corporate 
managers for certain claims while simultaneously forbidding the same corporations from 
directly indemnifying them.  Id. at 64 (observing that “one of the main functions of side A 
coverage is to protect the directors’ and officers’ assets in the event of bankruptcy”).  So, for 
example, the corporation may not indemnify managers for claims successfully pursued in 
derivative litigation against the corporation’s managers, but it can purchase insurance to 
cover the same managers for that contingency.  Id. at 43–44.   
 28.  Id. at 47 (“Payments under Side B coverage are thus triggered when the 
corporation incurs an obligation to indemnify its officers or directors, which most policies 
deem to be required in every case in which a corporation is legally permitted to do so.”).  
 29.  Id. at 47–48. 
 30.  See, e.g., Fox, supra note 24, at 288 (“The normal justification for having the issuer 
purchase directors and officers (D&O) insurance is that it is necessary to attract qualified 
people to do these other tasks.  The risk of a large judgment being imposed erroneously, the 
argument goes, would make such a person unwilling to serve without insurance.”).  Fox 
favors the dissolution of D&O liability insurance, and in its place, a cap on damages.  Id. 
     31.   Baker & Griffith, supra note 3, at 48.  This analytical move poses somewhat of a 
puzzle.  If, as Baker and Griffith claim, private shareholders’ litigation is inadequately 
deterring managerial misconduct, then why do they so easily let Side A insurance off the 
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Having laid out the various components of the D&O insurance policy, 
Baker and Griffith then consider whether D&O insurance maintains or 
reduces shareholder litigation’s deterrent effect.  An insurance policy that 
completely insulates a director or officer from monetary payment, 
regardless of how poorly that director or officer has behaved, is undesirable 
because it creates moral hazard.  Accordingly, throughout much of the 
book, Baker and Griffith inquire of their research subjects whether D&O 
insurance carriers adequately prevent the moral hazard problem through the 
pricing of insurance policies, increased monitoring of insureds, and 
adequate control of litigation defense costs and strategy. 
For the most part, Baker and Griffith’s research demonstrates that 
D&O insurance carriers either fail to engage in the activities necessary to 
prevent moral hazard, or, at the very least, fail to do them as well as they 
should.  Through a collection of extensive interviews, which they excerpt 
throughout the book, Baker and Griffith demonstrate that D&O policies do 
not result in increased monitoring during the life of a policy;32 or a robust, 
experienced-based pricing of policies;33 or in the proliferation of loss 
prevention services.34  Nor do they result in sufficient monitoring once a 
lawsuit is actually brought.35  To the contrary, insurers allow corporate 
defendants to shape the litigation strategy and settlement terms, and place 
far less oversight over corporate defense counsel than the purveyors of 
other types of insurance.36 
Even worse, the insurance appears to forge an unholy alliance between 
defense and plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Because the insurance policies include 
explicit coverage exclusions for fraud and intentional misconduct,37 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who obtain the policies through discovery and are 
keenly aware of their limits and exceptions, intentionally alter their 
pleadings and negotiation stances in order to access the amounts set forth in 
 
hook?  More importantly, why are they so dismissive of Side B insurance, assuming 
managers might feel more comfortable signing a contract with a company that had bonded 
itself for insurance with a third party?   
 32.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 109. 
 33.  Baker and Griffith worry that although carriers attempt to price “governance risk” 
into the insured’s D&O policy, they do so ineffectively:  “[T]he actuaries we interviewed 
doubted that underwriters have a consistent system of evaluation that applies the same 
factors in the same way over time.”  Id. at 98. 
 34.  Id. at 109. 
 35.  Id. at 130. 
 36.  On claims management, see id. at 134 (concluding that “D&O insurers have 
relatively little control over who conducts the defense” and “over how the defense is 
conducted”).  
 37.  Id. at 48–51.  “[O]nce a claim is moving toward settlement at or near the limits of 
the D&O policy, the plaintiffs and the defense have common adversaries—namely, the 
D&O insurers.”  Id. at 143.  
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the D&O policies.38  Accordingly, D&O insurance not only increases moral 
hazard within corporate firms, but it also reduces transparency generally, 
since neither shareholders nor the public learn what has transpired. 
Baker and Griffith go into much further detail than is possible to 
convey in this Review, including an overview of the D&O market, excerpts 
of conversations with multiple players who describe everything from the 
pricing of insurance to the factors that drive settlements, and an analysis 
(and rejection) of the various reasons, other than agency costs, that might 
explain the purchase of D&O liability insurance.39  For the purpose of this 
discussion, it is sufficient to summarize their conclusions as follows:  
entity-side insurance plays the important role of capping liability 
artificially, reducing truth in claims, and creating moral hazard.  Directors 
and officers who are covered by state-of-the art D&O insurance policies 
can rest easy in the knowledge that they likely will never pay out a dime on 
a shareholder suit, and their company will pay little more than the amount 
previously negotiated by the company’s designated risk manager.40  
Shareholders, meanwhile, fail to enjoy the deterrent effect of shareholder 
litigation.  The game is rigged, the amount is capped, and shareholders 
lose.  Were one to stop here, one rightfully would be quite concerned. 
II. INTRODUCING THE POROUS BOUNDARY BETWEEN ORDINARY AND            
      EXTRAORDINARY FRAUD 
Although Baker and Griffith mount a powerful critique of D&O 
insurance, there are, fortunately, some good reasons to doubt that D&O 
insurance “ensures” corporate misconduct.  Because it is beyond the scope 
of their project, the authors do not consider at length how managers may be 
affected by the broader enforcement landscape, which includes public 
regulators, state attorneys general, and criminal prosecutors.  If public 
enforcement is strong, then D&O insurance’s effect on managerial 
behavior may be of less consequence than Baker and Griffith suspect.41  
 
 38.  Id. at 49, 147, 187 (reporting evidence that plaintiffs’ and defense counsel 
explicitly collude to convince D&O carriers to settle).  Baker and Griffith further observe 
that plaintiffs’ lawyers “plead strategically in order to avoid handing the insurer a valid 
coverage defense.”  Id. at 187.   
 39.  Id. at 51–56, 57–76.  
 40.  In some cases, the company itself may be forced to contribute to the settlement, but 
that contribution will be relatively small compared to its insurance coverage.  Id. at 10 
(reporting, from review of Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse website, that “the amount 
of the corporation’s contribution was substantially less than the amount paid by the 
corporation’s D&O insurers, and in some cases, the payment may have been part of 
satisfying an insurance deductible”).  
 41.  I do not mean to suggest here that public enforcement in fact operates at optimal 
levels.  
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Moreover, even if public enforcement is weak or uneven, there may be a 
good argument for fine-tuning or strengthening it rather than directing 
attention toward private litigation.42  Private litigation-as-enforcement, after 
all, includes a number of agency costs.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, insurance 
carriers, and even defense attorneys all have their own interests, which may 
or may not align with those of shareholders.  Public enforcement, at least in 
theory, can avoid some of these problems.43 
More importantly, the authors seem to assume that much of private 
litigation involves “ordinary fraud” that is beyond the pale of most public 
enforcement efforts.44  It is this assumption that this Review challenges.  
Consider the following:  let us assume that all shareholder losses stem from 
one of three causes.  The first is incompetence and bad decision-making.  
Officers and directors make numerous mistakes, some of which are masked 
by luck and some of which cause companies to lose money and fail.  The 
second source of loss is a type of misconduct that I will refer to for now as 
“ordinary fraud.”  Some commentators may refer to it as “garden variety” 
fraud.  Ordinary fraud results from agency costs that often reduce the value 
of the company.  Although vexatious, it is neither so harmful nor so 
complicated as to draw the ire of public enforcement authorities.  Finally, 
the third category is what I refer to as  “extraordinary” fraud.  
Extraordinary frauds involve more severe losses, threaten many more 
victims, and therefore trigger criminal and civil investigations by public 
authorities. 
I fully admit that for purposes of this analysis, the difference between 
ordinary and extraordinary fraud is purely result-driven: a fraud becomes 
extraordinary when public authorities decide to treat it as such.  I do not 
attempt to distinguish these categories by what corporate managers actually 
do because the law itself does not draw such a bright line.45  One of the 
great problems—and opportunities—for social planners is that putative 
defendants often do not know in advance whether an ordinary fraud is 
 
 42.  Indeed, several scholars have recently argued for increasing public securities 
enforcement with an eye toward reducing or eliminating certain types of private securities 
litigation.  See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14 (arguing for substantial narrowing of 
private fraud-on-market claims); Rose, supra note 14, at 1306 (proposing a public oversight 
approach whereby the SEC would prescreen private 10b-5 lawsuits). 
     43.   Rose, supra note 14, at 1305. 
 44.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 61. 
 45.  For example, the ordinary frauds that lay at the heart of the corporate accounting 
scandals in the early 2000’s morphed into super frauds simply because of their size.  See 
Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 36 n.179 
(2005) (explaining that, “the fraud in WorldCom—the recharacterization of ordinary 
business expenses as capitalized items—might easily be described as a ‘garden variety’ 
fraud, but its magnitude—eleven billion dollars—puts it into an entirely different 
category”).   
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likely to turn into a super fraud.46  Once upon a time, perhaps twenty years 
ago, Bernard Madoff’s investment sleight of hand may have seemed like an 
ordinary fraud.  By the time he turned himself in to the authorities in 
December 2009, however, his scam had grown into one of the largest Ponzi 
schemes of all time.47 
With this taxonomy of corporate loss in mind, we can better assess 
Baker and Griffith’s critique by asking the question:  how does D&O 
liability insurance affect the three types of shareholder loss described 
above? 
a.  Losses from bad decision-making and bad luck: 
Return, for a moment, to the first category of losses, which are caused 
by incompetence and bad decision-making.  It is impossible to denigrate 
D&O liability insurance for either causing or exacerbating these losses 
because shareholder litigation is not intended to deter or compensate these 
ills.  To the contrary, state and federal legislators and jurists have largely 
decided that incompetence and bad decision-making ought not to be the 
subject of shareholder litigation, much less class actions brought under 
Rule 10b-5.48  Markets and shareholder democracy take care of these 
problems, along with social norms and signaling.49  Accordingly, the proper 
 
 46.  More importantly, managers themselves may be unable to predict those instances 
in which ordinary fraud will morph into extraordinary fraud.  See Michael Guttentag, 
Stumbling into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 74 (A. Harel et al. eds., 2011) (citing 
research supporting the proposition that “accounting fraud is the unforeseen consequence of 
a sequence of minor and seemingly innocuous transgressions”); Sung Hui Kim, The 
Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
983, 997 (2005) (arguing that “the behavioral origins of lawyer acquiescence in corporate 
fraud are found in commonplace interaction in organizational settings”). 
 47.  See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Madoff is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009 (describing the scheme and sentencing).  
 48.  For example, Delaware General Corporation Law permits corporations to include a 
provision in their charters immunizing directors from monetary damages for losses 
stemming from good faith, but negligent, decisions.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) 
(2012).  Similarly, the well-known business judgment rule shields managers from judicial 
second-guessing of substantive decisions. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifood Int'l, 683 A.2d 
1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996).  For a general discussion of the business judgment rule, see 
Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory 
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 458–59 (2011) (footnote omitted).  For arguments 
that Rule 10b-5 was not intended to apply to garden variety violations of fiduciary duty, see 
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (rejecting Rule 10b-5 liability for “a 
breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresentation, 
or nondisclosure”). 
 49.  See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 46 (2008) (discussing various mechanisms, including markets and social 
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use of shareholder litigation is to deter fraud and intentional wrongdoing, 
and not mistakes or generalized nonfraud losses.50 
If, despite the above policies, private litigants can successfully dress 
up undeserving claims as “fraud”, then D&O insurance may provide a 
valuable second-best capping and shielding function for shareholders.  
Even where the merits are weak, private litigants and their attorneys may 
file fraud suits because the defendant has deep pockets, the public suspects 
fraud, or because attorneys are overly optimistic regarding their ability to 
file a pleading that withstands a motion to dismiss.51  Pleading 
requirements, including the stricter pleading rules ushered in by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199552 (as well as the demand rules for 
shareholder derivative suits) may be insufficient to screen out meritless 
claims.53  Accordingly, for this residual group, D&O insurance offers an 
adequate second-best mechanism for capping non-fraud liability and 
reducing the transaction costs of otherwise unproductive behavior.  
Although it does not completely insulate shareholders from these costs, 
D&O insurance keeps them in check and sets a useful frame around which 
litigants can bargain. 
This second-best hypothesis also explains Side A insurance, which 
Baker and Griffith more or less concede.  If shareholder litigation includes 
unproductive plaintiff-side behavior, then Side A insurance permits 
corporations to recruit talented officers and directors who also happen to 
have particularly deep pockets (since those with deep pockets would be 
afraid to attract individual suits), and reduces costly and inefficient risk 
aversion among corporate managers.54 
 
norms, that govern corporate managers).  
 50.  One of Macey’s arguments is that political forces have combined to undermine the 
market forces that are best poised to deal with a number of corporate governance problems.  
Id. at 46–47. 
 51.  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic At Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the 
Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 155–56 (2009) (explaining that amount of recovery and 
uncertainty over causes of fraud can exacerbate lawsuits).  On the uncertainty inherent in 
corporate law, see Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate 
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 888 (1999). 
 52.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act requires plaintiffs to plead specific 
facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of the defendant’s scienter.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-
4(b)(1), (b)(2).  See generally ARTHUR PINTO & DOUGLAS BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING 
CORPORATE LAW 512–15 (3rd ed. 2009) (summarizing the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act).   
 53.  With regard to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Baker and Griffith 
observe, “Our respondents seemed to confirm . . . that the motion to dismiss is not a perfect 
filter for separating good liability cases from bad liability cases.”  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra 
note 3, at 170. 
 54.  As Ehud Kamar has observed, insurance is additionally valuable because it 
converts a volatile, one-time payment into a series of predictable, annual (premium) 
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b.  Losses from fraud and intentional misconduct: 
Of course, most commentators would disagree with the proposition 
that all corporate shareholder litigation lacks merit, and quite a bit of 
research suggests that these commentators are indeed correct.55  So let us 
stipulate that among the many corporate losses experienced by 
shareholders, some number is caused by fraud or bad faith behavior.  From 
that perspective, shareholder litigation may be independently valuable 
insofar as it increases the cost of wrongdoing (either fraud or intentional 
dereliction of fiduciary duty) to directors and officers.  This is the point 
where Baker and Griffith’s critique becomes important.  If D&O insurance 
reduces management’s liability for misconduct, it also reduces the value of 
shareholder litigation by creating an accountability vacuum.  That vacuum, 
in turn, becomes much worse when liability insurance carriers fail to fill it 
with adequate monitoring, experience-based pricing, and control of ensuing 
shareholder litigation. 
Fortunately, private litigation is not the end of the story, because 
public enforcement impacts corporate management’s behavior as well.  
Although Baker and Griffith discuss public enforcers in passing, they do 
not give them full attention.56  This is in part because the authors assume 
some stable distinction between “ordinary” fraud and the types of frauds 
that trigger public enforcement responses.57  I focus on fraud here because 
the much of the book’s focus is on the securities fraud class action. 
It has long been recognized that the legal line between “ordinary” 
securities fraud and the so-called “sexier” version that lands one in jail is 
 
payments:  “Insofar as fiduciaries are risk averse, their disutility from high and infrequent 
monetary sanctions exceeds their disutility from low and frequent sanctions, despite the fact 
that the expected sanction is the same.”  Kamar, supra note 51, at 889.  Note also that a 
small, frequent sanction is less likely to spur costly efforts to avoid detection such as cover-
ups and obstruction of justice.  Accordingly, frequent, low-level sanctions offer society 
benefits in the form of reduced detection avoidance, and, consequently, reduced policing 
costs.  For more on how higher sanctions can trigger additional wrongdoing, see Jacob 
Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, Deterrence and Avoidance, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314 
(2009); Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006). 
 55.  See Langevoort, supra note 51, at 155 nn.15–16 (citing relevant research).  
 56.  Baker and Griffith concede that D&O insurance cannot shield corporate managers 
from criminal penalties and reputational harm, but presume that “these consequences do not 
follow from most acts that give rise to a D&O claim.” BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3 at 
60.  
 57.  “Our sense is that the truly massive settlements occur in cases in which the 
managers violated ordinary, business-as-usual norms by a very substantial margin, and thus 
the fear of residual corporate liability, or criminal liability, most likely does not deter 
managers who engage in more ordinary financial misreporting.  But this would be a worthy 
subject for more research.”  Id. at 61 (emphasis added). 
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quite faint.58  The federal law that triggers private civil liability for fraud 
and misrepresentation—Rule 10b-5—is the same rule that triggers both 
SEC enforcement authority and criminal prosecutions.59  Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 provide securities enforcers 
with a remarkable amount of enforcement flexibility.60  So long as the 
conduct is “willful”61 (and the much of the misconduct that concern Baker 
and Griffith could credibly meet this definition), the same conduct likely 
satisfies the requirements for criminal liability, provided the government 
has collected evidence sufficient to satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard.62  Accordingly, the legal boundary that separates purely private 
enforcement of securities law on the one hand, and public enforcement 
ranging from administrative proceedings to criminal prosecutions on the 
other, is factually and legally porous. 
Ordinarily, one might question the fairness and efficiency of a legal 
 
 58.  Baker and Griffith’s interview subjects refer to those instances of wrongdoing that 
trigger public enforcement as the “sexier” frauds.  Id. at 157.  “Cases with sex appeal, our 
respondents emphasized, are cases with scandalous or otherwise vivid facts.”  Id.  
 59.   17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).  Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to Section 
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  The Exchange Act provides 
for criminal penalties for “willful” violations.  15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).  See also United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 677 n.23 (1997) (reiterating that criminal penalties must be 
premised on a finding that the defendant intentionally violated the law).  For discussions 
regarding the implications of dual-remedy statutes, see Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing 
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025 (2001) (arguing for a single interpretive 
approach to dual remedy statutes); Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional 
Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209 (2003) (speculating how presence of dual remedies 
influences statutory interpretation in both civil and criminal cases).  
 60.  Among claims brought by shareholders alleging misconduct by officers and 
directors, “securities class actions represent, by far, the largest potential source of liability.” 
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 3.  
 61.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (providing punishments for willful misconduct).  The 
United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Eighth Circuits require a showing of 
intentional misconduct to meet the criminal willfulness standard.  United States v. O’Hagan, 
139 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1998); Trane Co. v. O’Conner Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 29 n.4 (2d Cir. 
1983).  The Ninth and Sixth Circuits permit a showing of recklessness for both criminal and 
civil suits.  United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
DeSantis, 238 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2000).  For a recently filed petition for certiorari discussing 
this circuit split, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McCall v. United States, No. 11-882, 
2012 WL 151756 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012). 
 62.  Indeed, as a growing number of scholars have observed (and criticized), it may be 
easier to prosecute a criminal violation than impose civil liability in the securities context.  
Richard Booth, What Is a Business Crime?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 142 (2008) (“The 
bottom line is that the standard of pleading and proof in a criminal proceeding is lower than 
in a civil proceeding.  Clearly, something is awry.”); Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization 
of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361 (2008); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among 
Corporate Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1474 (2009). 
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system that blurs the legal treatment of fraudulent conduct.  But here, the 
uncertain treatment of fraud may do some good, or at the very least, quell 
some of the concerns one might have regarding D&O liability insurance.  If 
corporate fraud can credibly trigger administrative proceedings, civil 
penalties, and criminal investigations of intentional wrongdoing, then even 
the state of the art insurance policy has significant limitations.  After all, as 
Baker and Griffith demonstrate, D&O insurance policies contain coverage 
exclusions against fines, penalties, and payments for adjudicated violations 
of the law.63  If a public enforcer so desires, she can extract admissions of 
intentional wrongdoing, seek fines and penalties that are explicitly 
excluded by the policy, and impose structural reforms that are costly to the 
company and its managers and yet beyond the reach of any D&O policy.64  
In the worst of cases, a public enforcer may seek corporate prosecutions 
and entity-level indictments, all of which will do massive damage to the 
company’s reputation and future prospects. 
Public enforcement is bad enough for the company, but it can be far 
worse for the specific individuals the government targets, particularly when 
the company decides to cooperate in the government’s prosecution of 
corporate managers.  Indeed, even when (or particularly when) the 
government treats a corporate entity relatively leniently, it may focus 
keenly on one or more corporate managers responsible for intentional 
violations of law.65  D&O insurance offers little assurance to the targets of 
such investigations.  It does not prevent or compensate the public stigma 
attached to civil and criminal enforcement proceedings; the loss of one’s 
job; suspension or exclusion from participating in one or more regulated 
industries; or, most dramatically, the imposition of a sentence of 
imprisonment. 
In sum, disastrous consequences can flow from a public enforcer’s 
investigation of fraud.66  Although private enforcers possess a number of 
 
 63.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 186. 
 64.  As Baker and Griffith point out, coverage exclusions for fraud often do not apply 
unless “adjudicated,” which may not even be the case in public enforcement proceedings, 
where defendants often settle without admitting wrongdoing.  Id. at 187–88.  However, the 
D&O policy still may exclude payments that are designated “fines” or “penalties” or 
disgorgement for ill-gotten gains.  See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT & JORDAN R. PLITT, 2 PRACTICAL 
TOOLS FOR HANDLING INSURANCE CASES § 14.14 (2011) (observing that the “typical D&O 
policy” excludes coverage for “criminal or civil fines or penalties imposed by law”).   
 65.  See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of 
Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 657–660 (2002) (describing the practice of “reverse whistle-
blowing” whereby corporations identify culpable employees in exchange for entity-level 
leniency from government).  
 66.  See Jonathan Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to 
Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 201 (2008) (describing the 
punishments endured by corporate managers who were caught “cooking the books”).  For 
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good reasons to downplay misconduct in order to avoid an insurance 
exclusion,67 public enforcers possess fewer incentives to hold their fire, 
assuming there exists robust evidence of intentional misrepresentations and 
schemes to defraud.  Moreover, if public enforcers are in fact abdicating 
their roles by declining cases or unnecessarily abandoning the requirement 
that corporate managers admit wrongdoing as a condition of civil 
settlements, then perhaps the easiest way to deter corporate misconduct is 
to demand changes in public enforcement, assuming such demands are 
warranted.68 
Now it would be one thing if, despite the weak legal boundary 
between private and public enforcement, corporate wrongdoers could still 
predict with relative certainty the practical amount of wrongdoing that 
would trigger public enforcement.69  It would be cause for great concern if 
managers could calibrate, with precision, the amount of fraud likely to 
trigger weak or strong public enforcement responses.  This, however, 
would require managers to (a) identify the public enforcement trigger, ex 
ante, and (b) ensure that the extent of their fraud remained below that 
trigger.  Under these conditions, managers would be able to do a fair 
amount of damage to the corporation’s shareholders and capital markets in 
general.  Directors and officers would take the modicum of care to avoid 
public enforcement inquiries while simultaneously stealing (albeit slowly 
 
more on corporate losses following public enforcement proceedings, see Jonathan Karpoff, 
D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 581, 581–611 (2008).  For more on the drawbacks of a corporate-
wide criminal indictment, see United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (referring to entity-wide indictment as the equivalent of a death sentence); Miriam H. 
Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1090–92 (2008) (describing the 
consequences of indictment). 
 67.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3 at 186–88.  
 68.  See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)(rejecting 
proposed settlement with Citigroup for alleged misrepresentation in sales of mortgage-
backed securities).  Judge Rakoff’s opinion in the case pointedly took the SEC to task for 
failing to extract any admission of wrongdoing from Citigroup:  “Here, the SEC’s long-
standing policy—hallowed by history, but not by reason—of allowing defendants to enter 
into Consent Judgments without admitting or denying the underlying allegations, deprives 
the Court of even the most minimal assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being 
asked to impose has any basis in fact.”  Id. slip op. at 9.  The Second Circuit, however, 
rejected the district court’s authority to impose such demands on the SEC.  SEC v. Citigroup 
Global Mkts., 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d. Cir. 2012) (criticizing the district court for interfering 
with the agency’s “judgment on wholly discretionary matters of policy”).   
 69.  For example, drivers can safely ignore a highway sign that specifies a speed limit 
of fifty-five miles per hour if they know, from experience, that the police only arrest 
speeders traveling above seventy-two miles per hour.  Notice, in this instance, the drivers 
can safely drive above fifty-five miles per hour because (a) they are certain that the police 
arrest only those drivers whose speeds exceed seventy-two miles per hour, and (b) they have 
the absolute ability to drive at speeds below the unofficial speed limit.   
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and moderately) from the company’s shareholders.  The ordinary fraud 
would be left to private litigation and paid for by insurance (effectively, the 
shareholders who were themselves victims), and the extraordinary fraud 
would remain the province of federal prosecutors, state attorneys general, 
and SEC enforcement attorneys.  Machiavellian corporate managers who 
knew how to maintain frauds at so-called “ordinary” levels could enrich 
themselves at the expense of hapless shareholders, while their overly 
greedy colleagues fell prey to periodic show-trials.  Although Baker and 
Griffith do not portray this scenario outright, they seem to presume it when 
they concede only that public enforcement “may still operate to deter the 
worst corporate misconduct.”70 
Assuming we could test for the presence of these conditions (a stable, 
transparent enforcement trigger, and sufficient managerial control to keep 
fraud below that trigger), it is unlikely that we would find either of them.  
Public enforcement priorities are neither stable nor transparent.71  To begin 
with, public enforcement itself is hardly a monolith.  State attorneys 
general, who are funded by state funds and supported and elected by state 
taxpayers (including shareholders) may be more aggressive and potentially 
less predictable than the SEC officials who balance a constant need for 
public approval, congressional funding, and corporate cooperation.72  The 
SEC, despite its reputation for being weak, can also become more 
aggressive in response to enforcement competition by state prosecutors.73  
Federal prosecutors, meanwhile, may decide to enter the fray when the 
frauds in question trigger the institutional interests of their respective 
United States Attorney Offices.  Finally, public opinion, which ebbs and 
flows in response to economic cycles and salient scandals, also influences 
enforcement priorities.74  Accordingly, predicting public enforcement 
priorities is likely to be a risky and error-laden game. 
Moreover, corporate managers may not find it so easy to predict in 
 
 70.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 21. 
 71.  See Tom Baker et. al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental 
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (using empirical experiment to demonstrate the 
potential deterrence benefits that flow from uncertainty). 
 72.  See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 698, 701 (2011) (exploring how state enforcement of federal law provides states with a 
“unique” form of power).  
 73.  See Coffee supra note 4, at 779 (2007) (arguing that “competition among enforcers 
is healthy and has filled gaps in securities enforcement”).  
 74.  Id. at 781 (discussing how state attorneys general are “adept” at marshaling public 
opinion in their favor); see also Stephen Choi, et. al., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: 
Salience and the Arc of the Option Backdating Investigation (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 11-20, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876725 (providing empirical evidence 
that state attorneys general are in fact adept at marshaling public opinion in their favor). 
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advance how far or deep an apparent “ordinary” fraud will extend.  Like 
the public enforcement world, the corporate world itself is complex and 
difficult to predict.  A single decision to cook the books in one quarter may 
commit a manager to cooking the books in all subsequent quarters, lest he 
alert observers that prior reports were wrong.75  By the same token, a 
manager who thinks he has uncovered mere “ordinary fraud” may later find 
out that he has uncovered not simply a single instance of fraud, but in fact 
the tip of a “super fraud” iceberg. 
So if we assume that the practical, as well as legal boundaries between 
white lies and disastrous deception are easily crossed, then it is not at all 
clear that D&O insurance’s marginal effect on deterrence is as negative as 
the authors’ account suggests.  Corporations—particularly large, publicly 
held ones that are continuously in the public eye—should have good reason 
to fear public regulators and prosecutors, assuming those regulators and 
prosecutors are competent and motivated.  This is true even if the number 
of cases prosecuted criminally is low relative to the number of class action 
claims filed civilly, or if the amount of fines collected civilly far outstrips 
the dollar value of fines collected through criminal and SEC enforcement 
proceedings.76  What matters is that officers and directors perceive a real, 
credible threat that the fraud they promulgate or cover up will grow into the 
kind of scandal that triggers protracted investigations, unpleasant 
government oversight, and significant reputational costs to their company 
and to them personally. 
Even more so than its managers, the corporation’s in-house attorneys 
are likely to be keenly aware of the potential for frauds to blow up into 
high-profile scandals.77  Public enforcement has, through a number of 
different mechanisms, imposed obligations on all publicly held companies 
to improve their overall compliance with the law, all of which increases 
internal monitoring and external reporting by corporations.  Accordingly, 
corporate in-house attorneys and their external legal advisers are quite 
aware of the compliance requirements embedded in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
 75.  Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1295 (2008). 
 76.  See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1542–1551 (2006) (comparing the incidence and 
intensity of private and public proceedings and penalties); see also Cox & Thomas, supra 
note 20, at 777 (finding a “modest overlap” of fifteen percent between SEC enforcement 
proceedings and private securities fraud proceedings filed between 1997 and 2002).  For 
more on regulatory intensity and enforcement, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and 
the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 258 (2007); Howell E. 
Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 271–80 (2007). 
 77.  Indeed, this fear of fraud may cause corporate attorneys to overlook more 
pernicious threats to the corporation’s health, such as excess risk. 
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Act, the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and the charging memoranda 
and enforcement guidelines maintained respectively by the Department of 
Justice and the SEC.78  Regardless of whether they are actually cost-
effective, it is not a far cry to assume that these programs have increased 
officers and directors’ awareness of the potential for public enforcement’s 
tangible and intangible costs.79 
This richer account of corporate fraud enforcement and compliance 
yields several conclusions.  First, for the clear-eyed, rational manager 
(“Rational Manager”), the decision to engage in fraud is fraught with 
dangerous consequences.  Ordinary fraud can turn into extraordinary fraud, 
and extraordinary fraud, when it comes to light, triggers public 
enforcement and uniformly negative consequences for the company and its 
individual managers.  Similarly, the decision to ignore or concur in 
someone else’s ordinary fraud (the usual claim lobbed at directors and 
willfully blind managers) is equally senseless.  The ordinary fraud that the 
Rational Manager chooses to ignore might well mask extraordinary fraud, 
or transform itself relatively quickly.  The risks, even discounted and long-
term as they may be, outweigh the benefits. 
For the myopic manager (“Myopic Manager”), the calculation is 
admittedly different.  Myopic Manager cares most about “making his 
numbers” and maintaining his job and receiving his next bonus.  
Alternately, if he is innocent of his own wrongdoing but becomes aware of 
someone else’s, Myopic Manager is intent on “not making waves” again 
because he is worried about maintaining his position and receiving his next 
bonus.  In both cases, Myopic Manager vastly discounts the likelihood that 
his (or someone else’s) minor fraud will turn into extraordinary fraud; 
accordingly, Myopic Manager is not deterred by potential criminal 
penalties or the substantial enforcement sanctions that attach to his decision 
not to report someone else’s fraud.  But notice, Myopic Manager probably 
would not be deterred by the loss of insurance coverage either.  This is so 
because Myopic Manager vastly discounts the likelihood that anyone will 
 
 78.  See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 949, 958–75 (2009) (describing legal developments that fueled rise of compliance 
industry) and Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the 
Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23 (2010) (providing an 
overview of different compliance requirements and enforcement guidelines).   
 79.  See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, 
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 233–35 (2009) (explaining how legal 
expression can create “focal points” that make certain outcomes more likely, even when 
enforcement is relatively unlikely); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in 
the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Compliance, 
42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 865 (2008) (using experimental evidence to show how focal points 
form in response to legal developments).  
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catch him or his colleagues.  The solution for curing the manager of his 
myopia is not to remove his employer’s Side B and C insurance protection, 
but rather to increase, in a credible manner, the likelihood of the fraud’s 
detection, and to decrease the types of structural weaknesses that encourage 
fraud in the first place.80 
Currently, D&O carriers perform neither of these tasks.  They do not 
monitor insureds so closely as to increase the likelihood of fraud detection, 
and they do not offer the types of structural loss prevention services that 
would reduce the incidence of overoptimistic performance promises.81  
Baker and Griffith attribute this failure to managerial agency costs.  But it 
may also be that the services are particularly difficult to design and sell.82 
More importantly, the carriers’ reticence also may stem from the fact 
that public enforcers maintain considerable prerogative to define what 
constitutes adequate oversight.  For example, public enforcement agencies 
already require corporations to maintain “effective” compliance programs, 
whose effectiveness are measured not in terms of aggregate data, but rather 
by the gestalt conclusions of enforcement agents and prosecutors.83  The 
same public enforcers offer corporations leniency in exchange for 
monitoring and reporting of wrongdoing.84 
If public enforcers maintain ultimate discretion to decide what 
constitutes “effective” corporate compliance and reporting, then it is not 
surprising that insurance carriers have largely avoided the corporate 
monitoring and loss prevention businesses.  Carriers cannot easily advise 
 
 80.  See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know about Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 817–18 (2010) (providing empirical and 
theoretical evidence that deterrence is better achieved by increasing the likelihood of 
detection, rather than increasing the severity of sanctions). 
 81.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 105.  
 82.  Compliance services are arguably experience or credence goods.  “Experience 
goods” are ones that can be judged only after the purchaser has enjoyed personal experience 
using the good.  “Credence goods” are goods whose intrinsic values are difficult to discern 
and therefore require the purchaser to place much credence in the sellers’ claims.  See 
generally Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of 
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 317–18 (2009) (explaining how 
corporate governance reforms can be credence goods); Omari Scott Simmons, Corporate 
Reform as a Credence Service, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 113, 119 (2010) (elaborating on the 
“credence characteristics of corporate governance reform”).  
 83.  See, e.g., Baer, supra note 78, at 977-78 (criticizing the Department of Justice for 
failing to systematically gather data on compliance, or rely on such data in making 
individual decisions). 
 84.  Id. at 972.  For an overview of corporate criminal liability and an economic 
analysis of how offers of leniency can improve deterrence, see Jennifer Arlen, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW  
(Hylton et al. eds., forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1890733. 
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their corporate customers how public enforcers will respond to a particular 
oversight or monitoring problem.85  That job falls to the corporation’s in-
house and outside counsel, who not only have sufficient expertise to judge 
what public prosecutors and regulators (often attorneys) may do, but also 
have the ability to influence what those same enforcers will do.  Insurance 
carriers can make bets on which compliance failures trigger liability; 
lawyers, by contrast, can persuade the public officials responsible for 
deciding whether and how much liability the corporation will incur.  To put 
it in the insurance vernacular:  corporate attorneys do not simply predict the 
risk of fires; in some circumstances, they actually extinguish them too.86 
Given the foregoing, it is hardly surprising that corporate attorneys 
(internal or external) advise the corporation on the content and structure of 
the corporate compliance program, as well as whether and when to report 
wrongdoing, and the likely penalties that will befall the corporation in the 
event of a compliance breakdown.87  Even if D&O insurance carriers could 
perform these functions more effectively than attorneys, corporations 
currently have far greater incentive to place these functions with corporate 
counsel so long as public enforcers remain in the mix.88 
Moreover, even if public enforcement agencies were to relinquish 
their monopoly on the definition of “effective” internal compliance, the 
 
 85.  As Baker and Griffith observe, carriers do in fact attempt to price governance risk 
into the D&O policy, even though they fail to monitor the corporation during the life of the 
policy and fail to offer incentives for companies to reduce governance risk.  Moreover, 
carriers have hired forensic accountants to evaluate the corporation’s internal controls. 
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 92. 
 86.  One might imagine a world in which carriers employed attorneys to predict public 
enforcement response, much the same way carriers employ forensic accountants.  Even 
here, it seems unlikely that the corporation would forego the opportunity to seek advice 
from attorneys directly since that advice would be protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
and because the attorney would be better positioned to interpose herself between the 
company and public enforcement agency. 
 87.  See Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 450 
(2008) (exploring the expansion of in-house counsel’s duties to include monitoring of 
corporate compliance); Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying 
Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011) (discussing the 
importance of in-house counsel in guarding against corporate fraud and opportunism). 
 88.  There is currently debate on whether the corporation’s compliance program ought 
to be kept separate from the General Counsel’s department.  See Michele DeStefano, The 
Government’s Unofficial Stance on Compliance Departments: To Comply or Not To 
Comply 21–35 (Dec. 23, 2011) (unpublished article) (on file with author) (reporting on 
interviews with general counsel and compliance officers).  This debate, however, does not 
alter the fact that corporations are much more likely to rely on lawyers than insurance 
carriers to design corporate compliance systems, insofar as lawyers can better deduce public 
enforcement’s reaction to a given compliance failure.  Indeed, DeStefano’s research 
revealed that many compliance departments continue to employ attorneys, despite the fact 
that the department exists outside of the general counsel’s office.  Id. at 10.  
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carriers’ collective ability to set compliance obligations at optimal levels 
still would not be a forgone conclusion.  Baker and Griffith contend that 
insurance carriers are best positioned to reduce the risk of corporate fraud 
because their money is on the line.89  But Baker and Griffith’s interviews 
with the insurance carriers’ employees ironically do not inspire much 
confidence.  Some of the guidelines that influence the carriers’ pricing 
(albeit moderately), for example, are little more than bromides:  “To me, 
my style in terms of underwriting has been to look for the way people deal 
with certain issues and how they view their goals and how they are going to 
achieve them.”90 
There is hardly anything objectionable about the above statement.  
Nor is there anything particularly objectionable about seeking information 
on internal structure, information flows, or CEO perquisites, all of which 
seem to matter to the D&O insurance agents who price governance risk.91  
But much of this information is already sought by multiple parties, most 
notably institutional shareholders and their advisory services.92  Why are 
we so sure that insurance carriers are seeking better information, or are 
better positioned to evaluate the information they receive?93 
Despite the foregoing, Baker and Griffith have raised an important 
point.  To the extent we employ a “multienforcer” approach to various 
types of corporate fraud, at least one of those “enforcers”—private 
shareholder litigation—may be weaker than we realize, thanks to D&O 
insurance.  This, in turn, places greater reliance on public enforcers.  Were 
all public enforcers deeply captured and enforcement actions by state and 
federal officials unsuccessful or nonexistent, Baker and Griffith’s findings 
would be cause for real concern.  And indeed, for some types of 
wrongdoing, concerns about diffident public enforcers may be well-
 
 89.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 221. 
 90.  Id. at 89.  
 91.  Id. at 88–92. 
 92.  For an overview and critique of such advisory services, see Paul Rose, The 
Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887 (2007) (arguing that conflicts of interest 
reduce credibility of proxy advisors’ governance advice).  Rose has also argued that the link 
between “good corporate governance” (as defined by proxy advisory services) and corporate 
performance is uneven:  “[T]his is primarily due to the fact that ‘good’ corporate 
governance is firm-specific and often based on qualities, such as corporate culture, that are 
not readily quantifiable and so are difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.”  Paul 
Rose, Regulating Risk by “Strengthening Corporate Governance,” 17 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 11 
(2010) (questioning the Dodd-Frank Act’s emphasis on “strengthening corporate 
governance” by focusing on executive compensation and shareholder proxy access).   
 93.  According to Baker and Griffith, “[m]ost insurers are not rigidly quantitative in 
their adjustments to price.”  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 96.  The quantitative 
models that do exist are not necessarily well-designed or rigorous.  Id.  
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founded.94 
For example, nothing in recent memory has triggered so much 
criticism of the SEC as its abject failure to identify and shut down Bernard 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.95  The SEC not only failed to act on detailed 
allegations provided by an external financial analyst, but its agents 
arguably did not even comprehend basic finance concepts.96  These were 
hardly the building blocks of effective enforcement.  But even here, the 
SEC is not usually the sole source of public enforcement.  Where SEC 
enforcement agents fail, public prosecutors and state attorneys general may 
take up the slack, with varying results.97  Even when public enforcement 
withers, the public policy answer may not be strengthening private 
litigation, but rather, focusing on ways to improve and reinvigorate public 
enforcement, or channel public enforcement towards different targets.98 
The foregoing account is not intended to suggest that no one in 
corporate America commits fraud.  Nor is it to say that the current public 
enforcement system is the one we would choose were we starting over 
from scratch.  Nevertheless, despite well-documented weaknesses in 
portions of our public enforcement apparatus, those who commit corporate 
wrongdoing operate in a world in which drastic sanctions can apply 
depending on the fraud’s scope and the public’s animus.  As a result, 
corporate managers have good reason to avoid wrongdoing.  At the same 
time—and this is one of the recurring ironies of strong enforcement 
regimes—those who do engage in wrongdoing have very good reason to 
take substantial steps to hide their misconduct.  This is hardly a problem 
that Side A, B or C insurance has caused.  Nor is it a problem that ordinary 
insurance carriers can easily solve.  Indeed, the fact that managers hide 
 
 94.  See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 20, at 751 (observing that overall SEC 
enforcement volume is relatively modest).   
 95.  See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in 
Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899 (2009) (assessing bureaucratic and 
institutional failures that contributed to the SEC’s failure to detect Madoff). 
 96.  See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the 
Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363 (2009) (providing further overview of 
various factors that contributed to the SEC’s failure to detect Madoff). 
 97.  John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury 
Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 763–65 (2009). 
 98.  See Mark Klock, Lessons Learned from Bernard Madoff: Why We Should Partially 
Privatize the Barney Fifes at the SEC, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 783, 784 (2010) (contending that 
“the SEC is simply not capable of providing adequate protection for the integrity of our 
public financial markets without assistance from private attorneys general”).  Alternate 
approaches might be to encourage the SEC to focus more intently on corporate executives 
instead of corporations and their shareholders.  “[I]t has not always been so clear that 
executives are the primary focus of securities enforcement in financial misreporting cases, 
even when they are its main architects.  Their companies often seem to be the real targets.” 
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 627–28.  
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their frauds demonstrates an even deeper problem, which is that stronger 
sanction systems may lead managers to invest more strongly in detection 
avoidance, rather than simply desisting from fraud.99 
To sum up:  if we assume that it is difficult to distinguish between 
ordinary and extraordinary frauds, and we accept the fact that extraordinary 
frauds do elicit substantial public sanctions, and that those sanctions do 
alter managerial conduct, then fraud’s porous nature fills some of the 
vacuum left by D&O insurance.  Insurance may be overly costly, but it may 
not impose as much additional hazard as Baker and Griffith fear.  The 
corporate world poses plenty of hazards for shareholders, but those hazards 
stem from the fact that corporate managers exercise tremendous discretion 
over other people’s money.100 
III. POLICY PROPOSALS:  ENSURING D&O DISCLOSURE 
With this broader enforcement framework in mind, we can better 
understand and evaluate Baker and Griffith’s policy proposals.  To their 
credit, Baker and Griffith do not call for the elimination of D&O insurance, 
or for a rollback of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which set 
the high procedural thresholds that screen out the more fanciful plaintiffs 
claims, or for any of the dramatic reforms that critics periodically tout.  
Instead, Baker and Griffith focus on three policy adjustments that appear 
more moderate in tone and incremental in effect. 
Most relevant to this Review’s focus, Baker and Griffith propose a 
type of “coinsurance” whereby companies retain a portion of risk for 
wrongdoing.101  Through such coinsurance, companies would maintain 
some mandatory portion of risk for losses caused by managerial 
misconduct.102  According to the authors, this deliberate provision of 
residual risk would alter how managers behave before and after misconduct 
 
 99.  On detection avoidance, see generally Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, 
Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation Versus Ex-Post Punishment, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 
1 (2008); Sanchirico, supra note 54; Avraham D. Tabbach, The Social Desirability of 
Punishment Avoidance, 26 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 265 (2010).    
 100.  This point was brought home long ago by Louis Brandeis’ famous tome, OTHER 
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914).  For a discussion of Brandeis’ 
critique in the corporate governance context, see Edward Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, 
and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & 
Bala G. Dharan, eds., 2004).   
   101.    BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 222–25. 
   102.   The authors purposely leave open for future discussion the details of how much 
residual risk corporations would bear.  Id. at 223 (conceding that “[s]etting the optimal level 
of coinsurance would be a complicated corporate finance exercise that we will not attempt 
here”). 
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arises.103  
Putting aside the authors’ concerns about how corporations settle 
fraud cases, it is far from obvious that corporations with entity-level 
coverage do not already enjoy a fair amount of residual risk.  As the public 
enforcement discussion in Part II demonstrates, most publicly held 
companies already retain substantial risks related to the costs of preventing 
and responding to inquiries by public enforcers.  Nothing in a D&O 
insurance policy shields the corporation from the effects of an investigation 
by the SEC, the DOJ or any of the fifty state attorneys general.  A number 
of studies have documented the numerous ways in which public 
investigations and prosecutions harm both their corporate targets and the 
officers who are employed by them.104  Concededly, coinsurance would 
shore up deterrence in those instances where public enforcement is overly 
lax, and where managers can reliably prevent ordinary fraud from 
triggering public inquiries.  It is unclear, however, how much Baker and 
Griffith’s proposal would introduce expensive redundancies rather than 
close true gaps. 
Coinsurance is not Baker & Griffith’s central policy proposal.  Rather, 
their argument is that the SEC should mandate the disclosure of corporate 
D&O insurance policies.  Without question, this is their strongest and most 
elegant policy suggestion.  Their proposal for mandatory insurance 
disclosure would yield information currently unavailable to many 
shareholders, such as the policy’s limits, premiums and any exceptions.105   
To the extent information improves shareholder oversight through 
voting and exit,106 mandatory disclosure ought to be valuable.107  Assuming 
market failure has thus far failed to produce such information, Baker and 
Griffith’s proposal is quite useful.  That being said, the utility of the 
proposal would likely come down to the details of its execution.  As Baker 
and Griffith report, a number of aspects of the D&O policy have little to do 
with the carrier’s assessment of likelihood of wrongdoing, but rather with 
 
   103.    Id. at 224-25. 
 104.  See The Cost to Firms, supra note 66; and The Consequences to Managers for 
Financial Misrepresentation, supra note 66, at 209, 212 (2008). 
   105.  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 205–07 (observing that Delaware does not 
mandate disclosure of insurance policies, and that most states follow Delaware’s lead, with 
the notable exception of New York). 
 106.  Shareholders can exert pressure on directors and officers by voting for different 
directors (voice), selling their shares (exit), or bringing lawsuits (liability).  
 107.  On the efficiency benefits of publicly mandated disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox, 
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 254–55 (2009) 
(explaining how mandatory disclosure improves corporate governance) (citing John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 
Va. L. Rev. 717, 751 (1984)). 
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the risk of financial loss.108  Indeed, one of the authors’ criticisms is that 
carriers currently fail to price governance risk accurately.109  If carriers 
price governance risk sub-optimally, then shareholders are not likely to 
learn how strongly their investment is at risk for fraud or intentional 
misconduct. Perhaps mandatory disclosure itself would improve carriers’ 
pricing of governance risk, but this happy symbiosis is far from certain.110    
One can imagine other objections.  For example, depending on the 
uniqueness of policies, comparison of terms might be difficult.  The 
information conveyed by the policies also might be redundant, assuming 
analysts and sophisticated persons already enjoy access to much of the 
same information that insurance carriers consider.111  Moreover, an already 
overburdened public enforcer might experience difficulty ensuring that 
insurance disclosures were accurate.  At the other end of the spectrum, we 
might see the emergence of frivolous lawsuits for supposedly misleading 
D&O insurance disclosures.  
Despite these objections, the authors’ proposal is quite alluring.  
Surely, some of the information reflected in the corporation’s D&O policy 
would be quite useful.  Over time, sophisticated and institutional 
shareholders would be able to develop a sense of what terms certain 
policies ought or ought not to contain.  A corporation’s change in policy 
might trigger fruitful inquiries from shareholders or media analysts, as 
might a corporation’s failure to secure a policy similar to that of its peers.  
In sum, mandatory reporting may not be a panacea for the ills the authors 
describe, but it offers enough benefits to merit serious consideration.   
By contrast, a third proposal, which the authors explicitly label as a 
thought experiment, seems least tenable:  legislatures would impose a 
lottery system whereby five to ten percent of all shareholder class actions 
that survived a motion to dismiss would be selected for mandatory 
adjudication.112  The litigants bringing such cases would be forbidden from 
settling their cases prior to trial.113  The benefit Baker and Griffith 
hypothesize from this imaginary lottery is additional adjudication.  Were 
more cases to go to trial, courts would be forced to address more liability 
claims, sift through competing damage models, and impose penalty 
 
   108.    BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 3, at 87 (explaining that “underwriters now focus 
their financial risk assessment on such factors as the prospective insured’s industry and 
maturity, market capitalization, volatility, and other various accounting ratios”). 
 109.   Id. at 103–04. 
    110.    Id. at 219 (suggesting that “side benefit” of mandatory disclosure would be 
improvement of “product market efficiency” for D&O insurance).   
   111.   Id. at 217–18 (noting and responding to objections that sophisticated investors 
“already have at least as much access to corporate managers as D&O underwriters”). 
 112.  Id. at 229.  
 113.  Id.  
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decisions such that “the world of securities litigation . . . could begin to 
resemble the model of civil litigation propounded by legal academics.”114 
Leaving aside the proposal’s low political feasibility, which Baker and 
Griffith duly acknowledge,115 as well as the constitutional questions it is 
likely to generate (one can imagine some version of a due process 
challenge), the proposal ultimately reminds the reader why public 
enforcement is so important.  True, shareholder plaintiffs’ premature 
settlements may cause society to lose out on the informational benefits of 
adjudication on the merits.  Insurance carriers may well exacerbate this 
problem.  But the answer to this problem is not forced private adjudication, 
so much as it is the maintenance of robust public enforcement.  Where 
private parties seek quick settlements, public enforcers can pursue results 
that are more aligned with the public’s interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate fraud is difficult to prevent.  To reduce agency costs caused 
by shirking and other bad behavior, shareholders demand objective 
evidence of performance from officers and directors, who receive 
compensation, power and prestige in return.  When officers and employees 
meet or exceed the market’s performance expectations, all parties benefit.  
When employees and officers fall short of performance levels, however, 
they cast about for substitutes.  At least in the short term, fraud functions 
quite nicely as a substitute for performance.116  In the long run, however, its 
consequences are often disastrous. 
Given the negative consequences of fraud on society, Baker and 
Griffith rightly focus on the D&O insurance market and its effect on 
shareholder litigation and corporate governance.  Moreover, they do 
readers a tremendous service by meticulously describing the contours of 
the D&O industry and the manner by which D&O policies are marketed, 
sold and employed.  Their analysis of D&O insurance and its effect on 
private shareholder litigation, however, must be considered against a 
backdrop of overlapping and periodically strong instances of public 
enforcement and regulation.  If we believe that corporate officers and 
directors respond to the threat of criminal and civil enforcement and that 
public securities enforcement is even moderately credible, then the 
 
 114.  Id. at 228.  
 115.  Id. at 229 (recognizing that moral objections to use of a lottery to allocate legal 
rights would likely prevail).  
 116.  See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 106 (“The temptations [to commit fraud] 
are built into corporate capitalism, whether through concealment of bad news or overblown 
projection of future success.”). 
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situation is not quite as dire as one might conclude from reading Ensuring 
Corporate Misconduct.  So long as our public regulators and enforcers are 
informed, well incentivized, and competent, officers and directors have 
plenty to fear.117 
On the other hand, Baker and Griffith’s account ought to make us 
even more concerned when it appears that our public enforcers are not 
operating very well, or when we conclude that the costs of improving 
public enforcement are so great that we would rather focus on improving 
alternatives such as private litigation.118  If private litigation fills the gaps 
where public enforcement falls short; spurs public enforcement to do a 
better job; and aids public enforcement by directing regulators and 
prosecutors towards nascent scandals, then we might be concerned that 
D&O insurance undermines private litigation’s dual functions as a backstop 
and complement.119  Until we have a better handle on just how weak public 
enforcement is (and more importantly, whether and how corporate actors 
perceive these weaknesses), it is difficult to conclude how much D&O 
insurance “ensures” corporate misconduct. 
Hopefully, this is only the beginning and not the end of inquiries 
regarding the practical implications of liability insurance for corporate 
governance policy.  By providing information about an institution that 
operates primarily in the shadow of the law, Baker and Griffith have 
opened the door for additional research, albeit of a different kind.  For 
example, experimental research might demonstrate the extent to which 
managerial behavior is affected by changes in public versus private 
enforcement, as well as the difference between direct protection (Side A 
insurance) and indirect, entity-level protection (Sides B and C insurance). 
More importantly, those who study the field of D&O insurance would 
do well to separate out the product’s effect on independent directors 
(outsiders who bear the bulk of oversight duties), and its effect on inside 
directors and officers (often the primary architects of intentional 
misconduct).  It may be that the presence of D&O insurance reduces or 
weakens oversight intensity, but has relatively little effect on existing 
intentions to commit wrongdoing. 
Finally, as we increase our knowledge of how D&O insurance affects 
officers and directors, we ought to take into account the likelihood of 
 
 117.  Indeed, in some instances, corporate managers may be over-deterred.  See Baer, 
supra note 66, at 1061, 1063–66.   
 118.  For a recent critique of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, see Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop 
or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 813–15 (2009). 
 119.  See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case For 
Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273 (2009).  For evidence that public and 
private litigation overlap more than they complement each other, see Jessica M. Erickson, 
Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2011).  
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inconsistent enforcement by public actors.  For example, if public enforcers 
prefer to bring fraud enforcement actions against officers, but shy away 
from claims that are based more on oversight and lack of appropriate action 
by directors, then D&O insurance may affect management unevenly.  By 
the same token, highly regulated corporations may respond less poorly to 
D&O’s liability shield, whereas privately held corporations that fly under 
the public enforcer’s radar may be more prone to the moral hazards that 
Baker and Griffith understandably fear. 
If death and taxes are constants in American life, then so too are 
corporate frauds and the outrage that accompanies them.  For those reasons, 
it is beyond debate that public and private litigation responses will continue 
to thrive in the wake of corporate meltdowns and scandals.  The most 
successful policy prescriptions in this arena should be the ones that are 
backed by strong research and go beyond analysis of formal statutes and 
regulations.  To that end, Baker and Griffith are exactly where they should 
be.  They have made a number of sensible proposals backed by their 
knowledge of how D&O insurance actually works.  The authors have done 
us a great service by shining a light on the insurance world, a world that is 
murky and divorced from the written statutes and regulations that lawyers 
and judges know so well.  The challenge for researchers like Baker and 
Griffith—and indeed for all corporate governance policymakers—is to 
figure out how those sensible policy proposals fare as part of a broader 
enforcement landscape. 
 
 
